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 Evaluation Framework for Water Quality Trading Programs in the  
Chesapeake Bay Watershed 
   
Water quality trading programs are being proposed and implemented across the US in a variety 
of forms and with differing objectives. The programs being proposed and implemented in the 
Chesapeake Bay region are no exception.  Against this background the Chesapeake Bay 
Program’s Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee and the Mid-Atlantic Water Program 
requested a general framework to inform and guide the evaluation of the performance trading 
programs. This resulting report was developed by a workgroup comprised of ten individuals with 
extensive experience in the study, design, and evaluation of trading programs.  While the 
impetus for this report was to improve evaluation of trading programs in the Chesapeake Bay 
region, the evaluation framework is broad enough to apply to trading programs in general. 
 
Different trading program designs reflect different program objectives.  The objectives of a 
trading program will not only influence program design and implementation, but also the choice 
of criteria that should be used to measure performance.  The first section describes the basic 
forms of trading, and in so doing illustrates the diverse objectives of trading programs.   
 
The second section describes the use of structural design criteria as one approach to defining 
evaluation criteria.  The structural criteria identify design requirements that may be reasonably 
predicted to achieve particular trading program objectives. This approach to evaluation assumes 
that, if implemented, programs that meet these design criteria will perform in a manner that is 
consistent with program goals.  
 
The third section describes a set of performance criteria for evaluating trading programs.  
Performance criteria can be applied for ex ante or ex post evaluation (Tietenberg and Johnstone 
2004).  In an ex ante evaluation, such criteria are applied prior to program implementation to 
help select among alternative proposed designs.  In an ex post evaluation, the criteria are used to 
evaluate the outcomes of a program that has been implemented.  In the latter case, the existing 
trading program is evaluated against a select set of alternative water quality management 
instruments, including alternative trading designs that were not considered or, if considered, 
were not implemented. It is common to use the pre-implementation management strategy as the 
alternative in such an ex post assessment as it measures performance against what would have 
occurred had the pre-existing strategy been maintained.  In this case, the basic question is 
whether performance with trading is better than what had existed before.  But ex post 
assessments can also use as alternative strategies that might be of interest.  Such an evaluation 
would help water quality managers evaluate whether and how alternative trading program 
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designs, or alternatives to trading, would perform in comparison to a trading program that had 
been implemented.   
Whether ex ante or ex post, evaluating programs based on performance criteria, can be a 
complex exercise because the outcomes of any trading program must be evaluated against 
alternatives that could have been (but have not been) implemented in lieu of the current program.  
This requires a clear conceptual model, description of the alternatives, and a comparison of a 
counter-factual situation that assumes how both regulators and regulated parties would have 
behaved under a different set of program rules and circumstances.   This section concludes with 
an illustration of how evaluation of program performance can be simplified. 
The report’s final section contains conclusions that provide for both an understanding of the 
different forms of trading and the differences among programs. These conclusions should help 
increase the clarity and focus of public discussion about the merits of different trading forms, the 
strengths and limitations of current programs, and how improvements, if identified, might be 
implemented.    
 
Water Quality Trading Programs: An Overview 
Water quality trading programs can be designed and implemented in a variety of ways 
(Woodward and Keiser 2002; Stephenson, Shabman and Boyd 2005; Shabman and Stephenson 
2007; Shortle and Horan 2001, 2008).  For the purposes of this report, a general classification 
framework is used to identify five regulatory and trading program types: individual effluent 
standards (no trading) and four different types of trading programs (cap-and-allowance, cap-and-
direct, credit sales, and offsite compliance credits).   
Individual effluent standards, sometimes referred to as command-and-control, seek to secure 
water quality outcomes measured at the point of discharge.  Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 
individual effluent standards have been the primary regulatory tool used to control polluting 
discharges.  These standards are applied to point-source dischargers of specific pollutants and are 
administered through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).  The 
NPDES makes discharges into regulated waters conditional on having an NPDES discharge 
permit, which specifies the maximum allowable rates of pollutant discharges (e.g., the 
concentration of phosphorous in the flow from a wastewater treatment plant).   
 
NPDES effluent limits are of two types.  One is a technology-based effluent limit.  This type is 
developed by regulators taking into account available treatment technologies and their 
affordability.   Technology-based effluent limits (TBELs) are typically applied uniformly across 
sources or classes of sources (e.g. new versus existing sources). The CWA also instructs 
regulatory authorities to periodically review technologies and revise standards downward over 
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time, called technology forcing or “ratcheting down.”  In the event that TBELs for regulated 
point sources prove inadequate for receiving waters to meet ambient water quality standards, 
more stringent effluent limitations, called water quality based effluent limits (WQBELs) must be 
imposed by the permitting agency.  Such a standard still may not secure ambient water quality 
standards when nonregulated discharges are the primary cause of the water quality standard 
violation. 
   
To ensure compliance with effluent limitations, individual NPDES permittees must submit 
measures and records of effluent concentration and flow volumes according to procedures 
outlined by discharge monitoring reports (DMRs).  In addition to numeric concentration and load 
limits, individual NPDES permits may also contain instructions and conditions on the use of 
installed effluent control technologies. 
 
Traditionally, NPDES permittees were required to meet their effluent limits at the point of 
discharge.  This remains the case for TBELs (US EPA 2007).  But, the adoption of water quality 
trading programs can expand the options available for permittees to meet their WQBELs.  
Specifically, reductions in discharges from other point sources, or nonpoint sources if allowed, 
can be used to an NPDES permittee’s WQBEL. 
 
From Individual Effluent Limits to Trading  
 
Water quality-trading programs are not a substitute for government restrictions on effluent 
discharges.  They are instead mechanisms for allocating discharges among alternative sources. 
More importantly under some designs a trading program can facilitate and motivate individual 
dischargers and groups of dischargers to identify and adopt innovative ways to reduce pollutant 
discharges. Trading programs allow discharge sources, to meet their regulatory requirements 
through effluent reductions made by other regulated or possibly unregulated, sources.  The 
option to trade to meet effluent limits is a major source of the appeal of trading because it can 
allow for discharge allocations that reduce the costs of achieving water quality objectives over 
time and if designed in certain ways will accommodate economic growth while still maintaining 
water quality standards (Shabman and Stephenson 2007; Shortle and Horan 2008, Stephenson, 
Shabman and Boyd 2005) 
 
Shifting effluent loads between sources can be accomplished in fundamentally different ways.  
Two key features – effluent cap participation and decision-making authority – can be used to 
broadly distinguish between types of trading programs.  Each distinguishing feature of trading 
may be based on fundamentally different rationales and will have important implications for how 
trading programs are designed and implemented.  These multiple trading program forms can also 
reflect multiple and sometimes distinct trading program objectives.   
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Effluent Cap Participation and Trading 
 
Trading programs can first be distinguished by the scope of a load cap.  A load cap is the 
collective allowable load that may be discharged by an identified group of dischargers.  In turn, 
the cap is then apportioned to individual dischargers either through administrative allocation 
rules or through auctions. When the cap is set and then divided among those sources under the 
cap, the individual assignments are sometimes called discharge allowances1.  A discharge 
allowance is the legal authorization to discharge a specific quantity of pollutant within a 
specified time period. Participating sources face legally binding obligations to hold allowances in 
order to lawfully discharge.  The cap is the sum of the legal requirements to control discharge 
from an identified group of dischargers.   
 
Failure to limit total discharges below the allowance holdings would trigger enforcement actions 
and the imposition of financial penalties against one or more sources under the cap.  For 
purposes of this document caps are distinguished from load targets.  The Chesapeake Bay 
Program established a 175 million load target for total nitrogen to the Bay from all sources 
(http://cap.chesapeakebay.net/progress.htm).  The load target established a policy goal, but is not 
translated (completely) into legal obligations to limit discharges for all contributing sources.  
 
One type of trading program allows for a system of reallocation of effluent load control 
responsibilities within (or under) a predefined effluent load cap. Such a trading program grants 
dischargers authority to transfer allowances to other dischargers subject to the cap. Allowances 
may be defined when the cap is set by allocating a fixed number of discharge authorizations to 
all the sources under the cap, with the sum of the authorizations equaling the cap. In this case the 
authorizations to discharge are able to be exchanged. A second approach is to focus on the 
NPDES effluent limits at each source.  Over compliance generates a “credit” that can be then 
traded to a source that has under complied.  Thus, what is traded between sources over and under 
compliance with NPDES effluent limits and the cap is the sum of the NPDES permit limits for 
the sources under the cap.  
 
The logic here is the same as the way credits are generated for unregulated sources (see below 
for more discussion). In the cap case the baseline for credit generation is NPDES permit limit. 
Unlike allowances (which are defined in advance by a government agency), credits do not exist 
until reductions are undertaken and documented by the discharge source. In either case the trade 
will change the location of effluent discharges among sources subject to the cap (“point-to-point 
trading”).   
                                                            
1 The legal permission to discharge a given amount of effluent is called a variety of names including wasteload 
allocation (WLA).  
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The second type of trading program involves a regulated source or group of regulated sources 
meeting its effluent limitation by securing effluent reductions from a source or sources outside 
the cap (by implication, a source not subject to legally binding effluent control limitations).  In 
Chesapeake Bay region states, this situation universally applies to so-called trades between 
regulated point sources and unregulated nonpoint sources.  The regulated sources face a 
mandatory requirement to limit discharges, but would be allowed to increase discharges above 
that limit by sponsoring equivalent load reductions at an unregulated source (typically thought to 
be an agricultural operation).   
 
Reductions made by uncapped sources for sale to capped sources (ex. nonpoint sources) are 
commonly termed “credits”.  The load reductions eligible for trading by an uncapped source are 
calculated as the difference between a load with new effluent controls and a defined baseline. 
Unlike the credits created in the capped systems there is no regulatory load reduction 
requirement that can serve as the baseline.  
 
Trading either within or outside a cap is an important consideration in trading program design 
because it has implications for the defined purposes of a trading program and the ability to 
achieve those purposes.  In general trades within a cap provide the public with more assurances 
that water quality objectives will be secured.  A capped program requires a comprehensive 
accounting and tracking of loads because regulatory responsibilities and load accounting is 
defined systematically in advance of program implementation.  Total permissible loads are fixed 
and define by public agencies in advance of trades.  Sources subject to a cap are required to limit 
discharges to an aggregate, socially sanctioned level in the face of economic and population 
growth.  Because existing loads and allowances are defined in advance, any transfer of 
allowances between dischargers cannot, when properly executed, increase total loads.   
 
Trades outside a cap face challenges of providing the same level of assurance that results from 
trades within a cap.  In most trades outside a cap, the credit-creating seller is not pre-assigned a 
load baseline.  Thus, some procedure must be devised to establish a baseline load.  The 
procedure is only applied when a source decides to create a credit for trade.  The concept of 
additionality requires the trading program to determine that a claimed reduction would not have 
been achieved in absence of a trade.  Leakage is another issue that may be more challenging for 
trades with uncapped sources.  Leakage occurs when a trade results in unexpected and 
unaccounted for net increases in loads (see discussion below under the general heading of 
“Water Quality Assurances”).    
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Decision-Making Authority and Trading 
 
Trading programs can also be distinguished by who has primary responsibility over the 
management of effluent waste streams.  In discharger-directed trading programs, dischargers 
themselves have primary responsibility to determine how much they will discharge and how 
discharge will be managed.  In a regulator-directed system, the regulator assumes primary 
responsibility for how loads will be managed.2   
 
Discharger-directed trading programs are motivated by private financial incentives and 
facilitated by decentralized decision-making.   Decentralized decision-making in general relies 
on individual dischargers to make decisions over what pollution prevention strategies to pursue, 
how to operate pollution control technologies, and how many discharge allowances to hold. 
The authority to make decisions about how to manage waste streams, however, is defined and 
bounded by a general set of socially sanctioned rules that establish basic rules and identify 
impermissible behaviors.  For example, dischargers are required to hold allowances as a 
condition to legally discharge and are often prohibited from contributing to any localized water 
quality impairments.   Discharger directed-trading programs under a cap with allowances are also 
called cap and allowance trading programs. A variant would be a cap and credit trading program. 
 
Decentralized decision-making means that dischargers determine how many credits or 
allowances to buy and sell and under what terms of exchange. Under an allowance program 
design, the loads traded are fully at the discretion of the buyers and sellers, while in the credit 
trading design the trades are made in reference to seeking compliance with the technology based 
NPDES permit limit.   To exercise whatever discretion is present, trading programs must provide 
relatively low cost mechanisms for buyers and sellers to find each other, agree on terms of 
exchange, enter into contracts and then be assured of enforcement of contract terms (transaction 
costs).   
 
It is this program design where the financial incentives created by the opportunity to trade 
provide pollution prevention incentives (noted earlier).  The opportunity to trade creates a 
financial consequence on the decision to discharge for all dischargers (prospective buyers and 
sellers).  Prospective sellers have incentives to reduce discharges or costs in order to increase 
financial gains from trading.  Prospective buyers seek to reduce costs and discharge of their own 
waste stream in order to reduce compliance costs. 
 
                                                            
2 In any trading program, the responsibility for establishing the mass load cap and general trading rules is the 
exclusive responsibility of government.  The issue confronted here is who has responsibility to make decisions about 
how to manage effluent discharge under a mass load cap.  
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Dischargers must also be granted the means to respond to these financial incentives.  A 
discharger-based program grants discharge sources the authority to manage how pollutants will 
be controlled.  A fundamental requirement of a cap and allowance or credit trading program is 
that it be performance-focused.  Discharge-based trading programs focus attention on verifying 
the performance of dischargers (outcomes such as pounds of effluent released) and granting 
dischargers the authority to decide the means by which effluent will be controlled.  Dischargers 
are allowed to investigate, experiment, and implement pollution control strategies and 
technologies that are best adapted to their individual circumstances in an allowance program: 
there may be less room for innovation in the credit based program. The combination of financial 
incentives and decision-making flexibility provides dischargers with both the reason and the 
means for developing and implementing possible new, low-cost ways to reduce loads.  
 
Discharger-oriented trading programs, especially those based on allowances, are justified on the 
premise that knowledge of pollution prevention opportunities is fragmented, dispersed and 
incomplete. Those who advocate cap and allowance trading programs believe that the greatest 
potential for the development and application of new knowledge rests with those who stand to 
gain the most from its application and those with on-the-ground experience and knowledge of 
productive activities.  In addition, the development and discovery of new knowledge is 
constrained by individual decision-makers’ cognitive abilities. Unless given a reason to engage 
in the difficult and time-consuming process of thinking about wastewater management, many 
pollution prevention opportunities will simply go unrealized by both dischargers and regulators.  
With financial incentives, individual decision-makers who make pollutant generation, treatment, 
and discharge decisions are alerted to the importance of pollution prevention opportunities.     
 
In contrast, a regulator-directed trading program assumes a centralized regulatory agency is 
capable of assigning and reallocating effluent control activity among sources.  Regulator 
knowledge of the readily available control technologies and the site-specific costs associated 
with individual plants would allow such reallocations.  Given the presumed knowledge of control 
options, a regulator directed program might define acceptable technologies or prescribe specific 
technologies.  
 
In contrast to a discharger-oriented approach, the regulators also assume primary responsibility 
for ensuring that the cap is achieved through time.   Economic growth can occur without 
violating the aggregate effluent cap through the “technology-forcing” actions of regulators.  As 
new technologies are developed and proven, regulators may elect to lower the cap or impose 
more stringent technology requirements on selected subsets of dischargers.  In this way, 
additional room is made for growth of new (both capped and uncapped) sources.  Lowering 
aggregate discharge caps reduces the allowable discharges for sources under a cap and increases 
the demand for uncapped load reductions (application of pollution abatement controls outside a 
cap).   
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Regulator-directed trading is based on the premise that regulators, rather than dischargers, are in 
the best position to administer an effluent load management system.  Such a trading program 
relies on regulatory authorities to direct or manage shifts in effluent loads between sources.   
Regulatory agencies are thought to be made up of pollution control experts with extensive 
experience and training in pollution control technologies.  Publicly supported research grants are 
expected to target the most promising pollution control opportunities for development.  
Centralized expertise within regulatory agencies is deemed capable of developing systematic 
watershed scale plans to achieve water quality objectives.  This position may be reinforced by a 
belief that dischargers are not as capable of identifying, or as willing to make, pollutant reduction 
investments.  
   
These two distinguishing features of trading programs can be paired to create a taxonomy of 
trading types (Figure 1).  Trades can occur in the context of a capped system on discharge 
allowances where both buyer and seller face mandatory requirements to hold allowances as a 
condition to discharge (top row).  A discharger-directed capped program is Cap-and-Allowance 
Trading. (CAT)  In a CAT program, individual transferable waste load allocations are called 
discharge allowances.  CAT programs grant dischargers the discretion to manage loads and, 
therefore, allowances become the commodity exchanged between dischargers. As a variant of 
CAT and one that offers some (but less) discharger discretion, there is the cap and credit trading 
program, where the cap is derived from the sum of the individual NPDES permit limits. A 
capped, but regulator-directed trading program is called Cap-and-Direct (CAD).  Such programs 
rely on regulators to allocate effluent control responsibility in order to achieve and maintain a 
cap.  Similarly, trading programs involving trades between capped and uncapped sources can be 
distinguished by the authority to make effluent management decisions (bottom row). In these 
cases the capped sources are always the buyers of credits and the uncapped sources are always 
the sellers.  In what is called Credit Sales (CS), the credit is a load reduction (often beyond a pre-
determined baseline) achieved by the unregulated source.  Under a credit sales program, sources 
of credits are granted the flexibility to decide how loads are controlled.  The decision to buy 
credits and from what source is made by the capped source.  Under an Offsite Compliance Credit 
(OCC) program, the regulator will establish how the credits will be produced by the unregulated 
source and the same regulator will determine when the capped source can sponsor load 
reductions at an uncapped source, as opposed to controlling the loads at their own location.  
 
Whatever the form, there is another characteristic that will define the trading program: the 
exchange of legal responsibility for assuring that the required performance is achieved. In a cap 
and allowance program it is always the case that the entity that uses the allowance as the 
authorization to make a discharge is legally responsible for not making discharges that exceed 
the allowances held. However in the other systems it is possible that the legal responsibility for 
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assuring that the load reduction occurs may transfer to the seller from the buyer, or may remain 
with the buyer. In the later case this term for the exchange will increase contracting costs.  
Figure 1: Typology of Trading Programs 
 
 Centrally Directed Decision-
Making 
Decentralized Decision-
Making 
 
Trade under a Cap  
(typically Point-to-Point) 
 
Cap and Direct 
(CAD) 
 
Cap and Allowance Trading 
(CAT) 
 
Trade outside a Cap 
(typically Point-to-Nonpoint) 
 
Offsite Compliance Credit 
(OCC) 
 
Credit Sale  
(CS) 
 
Trading Program Goals 
Trading programs can be designed to achieve different (and sometimes independent) program 
goals.  A common goal of a trading program may be to develop an allocation system to achieve 
and maintain a socially prescribed aggregate load cap over time.  If the cap is tied to achievement 
of water quality standards, a CAT program would maintain public water quality objectives over 
time.  If there is no expected increase over time in loads from sources outside the cap the same 
result would be secured through a CAT program supplemented by a credit sale program. Trading 
of load responsibilities (allowances under a cap or credits outside a cap) is a means to this end, 
and not an end itself.  Trading simply provides the incentives and opportunities for participating 
sources to effectively and economically comply with public water quality goals over time 
(Program Goal 1 in Figure 2).  
One frequently adopted goal of a trading program is to create alternative compliance mechanism 
for an effluent standard (command and control) system (Program Goal 2 in Figure 2). As 
described above, for this form of program individual effluent limitations are set and sometimes 
lowered to limits-of-technology levels in order to meet water quality standards (water quality-
based effluent limits).  Regulated sources are expected to comply with the stringent standards.  
The water quality challenge, however, is confronted when economic and population growth 
increase wastewater flows and makes achievement of an individual mass load effluent limit 
technically infeasible.  In such instances, regulatory agencies will require compliance with 
effluent concentration standards, but may allow or require regulated sources to meet individual 
effluent load limits by securing offsets and equivalent reductions offsite.  The offsite effluent 
reduction activity (presumably securing reductions from a nonpoint source – a “trade”) becomes 
another permit condition for the regulated source.  
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Such programs do not create a system of allocating and reallocating load responsibilities under a 
mass load cap.  This type of trading program is a way for regulatory agencies to maintain 
compliance with the traditional program of individual effluent limitations.  It can be argued that 
such offsite effluent control responsibilities should not be called a “trade” at all.  The source is 
not allowed to increase its discharges if it secures (presumably lower cost) discharges from 
another source.  Indeed the source is directed by the regulatory authority to secure such offsets 
after it has met stringent effluent concentration limits in its wastewater that are chosen by the 
regulatory authority.  The offsite control requirements are additional permit conditions typically 
set to meet unavoidable growths in flows.  This type of trading program goal is a key component 
of the Maryland point-source trading program that was released in 2008.  
Finally, funding for nonpoint source controls often appears to be an important goal of many 
trading programs (Program Goal 3 in Figure 2). In many parts of the U.S., the single largest 
cause of water quality impairments is effluent loads from unregulated (nonpoint) sources.  
Absent setting legally enforceable limits on these sources, payments (public cost share programs) 
are made to subsidize activities that are predicted to reduce effluent or to create a profit incentive 
for demonstrated pollutant reductions. Public funding from general tax revenues for these kinds 
of payment programs is insufficient to induce reductions to achieve water quality standards. In 
such cases, trading programs are often viewed, at least in part, as another source of revenue to 
finance reductions in nonpoint source loads. The generation of funds for nonpoint source load 
reductions appears to be an important program goal of the Pennsylvania nutrient trading program 
that was developed from 2005-2007.     
 
The various program goals do not necessarily overlap.  For example, a trading program designed 
to achieve and maintain an effluent load cap may achieve that goal without ever leveraging 
resources for purchasing reductions from nonpoint sources.  Similarly, the goal of maintaining 
compliance with individual effluent limitations at individual sources is mutually exclusive from 
the goal of designing a decentralized load allocation system. Understanding and acknowledging 
Program 
Outcomes 
 
Performance 
Criteria to for 
achievement of 
program goals 
Program Design 
 
Structural Criteria 
for different 
program designs 
for specific 
program goals 
Program Goals 
1. Allocation 
System  
2. Compliance 
3. Nonpoint 
source funding 
Figure 2: Water Quality Trading Program Evaluation Framework 
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these different program goals is critical to program evaluation.  Evaluating whether one program 
design is better than another leads to the next question, “better at doing what?”  
 
Trading Program Evaluation 
The trading program evaluation framework developed here can accommodate the evaluation of 
trading programs that exhibit variations in program goals and design types. Trading programs 
begin with general programmatic goals (Figure 2).  Each goal can result in different trading 
program designs (as generally described in Figure 1).  Program design describes the general 
structure and operational rules believed necessary to accomplish and satisfy trading program 
goals.  Each trading program design will produce different behaviors on the part of dischargers 
and regulators, which in turn could conceivably produce different outcomes.  Outcomes of 
interest may include changes in water quality conditions, the total quantity of effluent load 
discharged, the development of pollution prevention strategies, the cost of managing effluent 
loads, and administrative costs.  
This section describes a set of general criteria that could be used in trading program evaluation.  
Two sets of program evaluative criteria are described.  First, the structural criteria that could be 
used to evaluate program design are described. Structural criteria evaluation involves 
identification of a set of requirements necessary for a particular trading program type (Figure 1).   
For illustrative purposes, the structural criteria for discharger-oriented trading programs will be 
described below.  Evaluating trading programs based solely on structural design assumes that 
there is a general agreement on program goals, dischargers’ and regulators’ behavior, and the 
performance that would be achieved if these structural criteria were met.  While these indicators 
do not relate directly to outcomes, the advantage is that indicators of structural criteria are easier 
to measure and evaluate than performance criteria (see discussion below). 
Next, a generalized set of performance criteria that might be used to evaluate economic and 
environmental outcomes are described. Other more specialized criteria that might be unique to 
specific program objectives are also identified.  The discussion will include identification of the 
requirements and challenges of producing measurable performance indicators.  
 
Structural Criteria 
This section describes the structural criteria used to evaluate the design of cap and allowance 
trading and credit sale programs.  Decentralized trading programs would, therefore, be evaluated 
by assessing how well program design matches these requirements.  While some of these design 
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criteria would be applicable to any trading program design, this discussion focuses on criteria for 
decentralized, performance-based trading programs 
Within the context of water quality trading programs, structural criteria might be grouped into 
two general categories: choice criteria and water quality assurance criteria.  Choice criteria 
describe the necessary conditions for dischargers to effectively participate in a trading program. 
The water quality assurance criteria is the set of requirements that ensure that water quality goals 
are achieved and maintained in the face of decentralized decision making over the type and 
location of effluent controls.  Water quality criteria also broadly define the realm of 
responsibility and concern of regulatory agencies while choice criteria address the realm of 
discharger decision-making.  
  
 
Table 1:  Decentralized System Structural Design Criteria 
Choice Criteria 
Commodity Criteria 
• Commodity defined in advance as effluent output 
• Discretion to determine how effluent discharge is managed 
Exchange Criteria 
• Flexibility to determine with whom and when to trade 
• Allow/facilitate multiple trade opportunities  
• Reduce transaction costs of transfers  
• Convey information about prices and trade opportunities 
• Define rules and terms of trade in advance  
 Investment Environment Criteria 
• Rule stability 
 
Water Quality Assurance Criteria 
Cap Setting Criteria 
• Inclusiveness (new and existing sources) 
• Size of cap 
Equivalence Criteria 
• Equivalence  
• Load Accounting 
o Additionality 
o Leakage 
Enforcement/Accountability Criteria 
• Monitor 
• Penalty 
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Choice Criteria 
Choice criteria include criteria for defining the transferable commodity, the system of exchange, 
and investment environment. 
Commodity Criteria 
All trading programs require a standardized commodity (or commodities). In water quality 
trading, the commodity is usually defined in terms of a type of effluent discharge expressed in 
terms of mass load and defined over a period of time (e.g. pounds per year) and is reflected in an 
authorization to discharge a certain amount of pollutant.  The commodity in trading programs is 
defined by the program and to the extent practical, should be defined in advance so as to provide 
dischargers clear knowledge and certainty regarding the conditions of the discharge authorization 
and the availability of the commodity. For example, a discharge allowance as defined above is 
the authorization to discharge a fixed quantity of effluent within a specific period of time. This 
commodity is defined at the start of the program. The commodity must be held in sufficient 
quantities in order to legally discharge (see enforcement criteria below).  
Credits, on the other hand, are created only when a discharger can claim (according to program 
rules) that total discharge is less than an identified baseline level of discharge (Shabman, 
Stephenson, and Shobe 2002).  Defining a credit requires an approved credit-generating 
methodology including how loads are quantified and baselines are defined.  
Dischargers holding or possessing allowances must also be granted discretion on how to manage 
their effluent discharge (Shortle and Horan 2008; Stephenson, Shabman, and Shobe 2002).  
While the allowance limits how much effluent can be discharged, program rules should strive to 
allow discretion on the selection of production technologies, pollution control equipment, or 
pollution prevention strategies that the discharger employs to limit waste discharges.3  This 
discretion extends to all trade participants (buyers or sellers).  This discretion also includes 
determining the extent to which effluent control will be managed within any given allowance 
holding.   
Defining the commodity based on effluent discharge requires quantification of load.  Given this 
emphasis, decentralized trading programs should be performance-based programs.  
Quantification of the effluent load discharged could be measured at the source.  To the extent 
practical, the effluent output and effluent discharge should be directly measurable at a reasonable 
                                                            
3 Assessing the degree of discretion should not be narrowly limited to just trading program rules, but should consider 
how complementary and supporting programs also expand or contract discretion.  For example, NPDES permitting 
requirements or capital grant programs may lock dischargers into specific technologies or effluent discharge levels 
that restrict dischargers’ ability to cost effectively meet their aggregate cap.  
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cost (Oates 1994).  Multiple methods of load quantification are possible ranging from methods of 
continuous measurement of flow and effluent concentration to a variety of sampling protocols 
(examples include those in NPDES discharge monitoring reports). Loads can also be quantified 
through modeled estimates of practices, but to do so is to take a significant step back from a 
performance based program.4    
Direct measurement of loads allows dischargers discretion to determine how to control 
discharge.  The preference for direct measurement of effluent discharge, however, is conditioned 
on the premise that measurement accuracy and precision can be secured at a reasonable cost. In 
choosing a method to quantify loads a choice must be made in recognition of the expected 
measurement error (loss of accuracy or precision) and the costs required to increase 
measurement accuracy and precision. In cases where direct measurement of outcomes is deemed 
too costly for the benefit of directly measuring performance, trading program designers may 
elect to model outcomes from a defined list of acceptable practices or technologies (as is the 
current practice for agricultural best management practices).   Limiting control options is a 
barrier to innovation, but also an understandable choice when contending with measurement 
cost/uncertainty.  Thus trade-offs can exist between measurement costs (and certainty) and 
choice over pollutant control strategies.  Trading programs can also be evaluated on the 
opportunity and incentives to expand choices and/or lower measurement costs.  For instance, 
trading programs that quantify loads (allowances or credits) based on modeled loads for a 
defined list of technologies can offer mechanisms to expand those lists with new information or 
reward efforts to measure outcomes with more certainty (more directly) (Stephenson, Norris, 
Shabman 1998).  
Exchange Criteria 
Trading also requires a system of exchange.  In general, an exchange system should provide 
participants multiple trade opportunities and discretion of when and with whom to trade.  
Exchange flexibility criteria would identify the extent to which dischargers decrease discharges, 
but also allow dischargers the discretion to increase discharges by purchasing additional 
discharge allowances (or credits).5  Trade opportunities provide sources with the discretion to 
                                                            
4 The performance-oriented criteria mean that trading programs strive to avoid tying allowance and credit definition 
too closely to a particular practice or technology.  Restricting allowance or credit generation to a particular practice 
(BMP for example) limits choices and reduces incentives to seek and develop more effective, lower cost 
alternatives.    
5 Numerous examples of legal and regulatory barriers to exchange flexibility can exist.  For instance, existing 
trading programs currently prohibit an individual point source discharger from every exceeding technology-based 
effluent limits (even if dischargers are reduced elsewhere). NPDES permit conditions are typically prescriptive and 
costly to change (Shabman, Stephenson, and Shobe 2002; Industrial Economics 2008) As a note of interest, US 
EPA’s Water Quality Trading Policy foresees potentially allowing a collection of point sources to satisfy their 
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choose individual discharge levels in ways that are cost-effective. Exchange flexibility also 
includes assessing how many different trading options are available to program participants. 
Multiple trading opportunities are needed to create competition, which should lead to lower cost 
control options.   
Effective exchange arrangements must also provide a low cost and timely way to evaluate and 
conduct potential trades.  The cost of coordinating buying and selling between trading 
participants includes search/information costs, contracting costs (negotiating a trade), and trade 
approval costs.  Effective exchange arrangements can also be evaluated on the effectiveness of 
delivering timely and accurate information about prices (bid and offer prices) and trade 
opportunities to trading participants.   
It should be noted that there exists multiple exchange arrangements that might meet these general 
exchange criteria.  For instance, a common perception is that formal market-like exchange 
arrangements are needed to convey bid and offer prices between buyers and sellers.  Formal 
market exchange, however, may be not feasible given the limited size and scope of many water 
quality-trading programs.  For example, a point source cap may include relatively few 
dischargers that intend to trade infrequently.  Alternative arrangements, such as discharger-
operated associations, can be used to meet the general criteria for an exchange system (low 
transaction cost among participants).  Within the nonpoint credit context, electronic clearing 
houses, aggregators, or publicly operated credit resale banks are all different ways that could 
lower transaction costs between relatively few buyers and multiple small nonpoint source credit 
suppliers.  The purpose of this discussion is not to advocate any particular exchange system, but 
rather to note that there might be multiple alternatives available that could conceivably be used 
to meet these general structural design criteria. Different exchange arrangements can be tailored 
to meet the unique circumstances of a particular trading program. 
In water quality trading, exchange systems require defining terms of trade between participating 
sources. These transfers refer to the various trading ratios that are intended to assure equivalence 
in water quality outcomes. For example trading ratios are typically required to account for 
differential spatial impacts (sometimes called “attenuation ratios”) and differences in load 
quantification between types of sources (explained in more detail below). The relevant point for 
a decision on evaluating choice criteria is that market-like trading programs operate best when 
terms of trade are defined in advance of trading activities and defined exclusively on assuring 
standardization of the unit of exchange (water quality equivalence).   
                                                                                                                                                                                               
collective effluent load limits defined by technology-based standards, via water quality trading.  This change, 
however, would require EPA to revise its technology-based effluent guidelines.  This would considerably expand 
exchange flexibility in water quality trading programs.   
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Investment Environment Criteria 
Finally, decentralized trading programs require stable and well-defined rules. Such stability 
reduces unnecessary uncertainty in the rules surrounding the use and transfer of the transferable 
commodity (allowances and or credits).  Well-defined trading program rules that are not subject 
to unanticipated change provide a supportive climate for engaging in trade activity and pursing 
pollution prevention investments.  For example, rule changes that penalize beneficial and 
successful prior investment decisions also undermine incentives for dischargers to make future 
pollution prevention investments.   This is a particular concern if pollution prevention 
innovations that reduce the cost and discharge of pollutants may induce regulatory authorities to 
lower allowable load limits.  
Water Quality Assurance Criteria 
Water quality assurance criteria are the second general class of structural criteria that must be 
met in cap-and-allowance trading/credit sales trading programs.  Quality assurance is used here 
as the collective term for a broad range of trading program criteria that can help to ensure that the 
water quality objectives of a trading program are met.     
Cap Setting Criteria 
The establishment of the cap is a primary means by which trading programs achieve water 
quality standards.  An important criterion for cap setting is inclusiveness of existing and new 
sources.  Cap inclusiveness defines who must participate in the cap (who must legally be 
required to hold allowances and limit discharge). Typically, caps are applied to point sources.  
Cap coverage, however, should be as broad as feasible and encompass as many sources as 
possible.6  Expanding cap coverage would not only include placing small point sources under a 
cap, but also nonpoint sources as well.  Furthermore, requiring new and expanding sources to 
“buy-into” the existing cap by purchasing allowances also expands cap coverage.  In other 
words, regulatory officials should not increase the size of the cap to accommodate new discharge 
sources.  The more inclusive the cap, the greater assurance the public will have that water quality 
standards will be achieved and maintained.  
The size of the cap refers to the total allowable pounds of effluent that may be legally released by 
sources subject to the cap.   Conceptually, the size of the cap should be consistent with the water 
quality objective. A “TMDL-like” evaluation for determining the total load of a pollutant that 
will achieve the water quality standard at a point in the water body would be used to determine 
                                                            
6 The feasibility of cap expansion could be limited by lack of legal mechanisms to enforce discharge requirements 
and the cost of identifying, quantifying, and enforcing mass load limits on different sizes or classes of discharge 
sources.  
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the cap. This analytical process would model not only the loads to the water body, but also the 
fate and transport of that load through the system in order to determine the effect of a load at one 
location on the water quality criterion in the target area. However, given the uncertainties in such 
TMDL evaluations (Shabman, et al. 2007) the trading program may need to anticipate and 
accommodate the possibility that load limits will be revised over time.     
Criteria for establishing cap size becomes less clear when the cap only applies to a subset of 
sources (point sources) and the capped sources do not represent a large portion of the total 
effluent load entering the water body.   Under these conditions it may be difficult to achieve 
water quality standards by capping a subset of sources.  This is because the achievement of water 
quality goals also depends on effluent reductions achieved by non-capped sources in the 
watershed; hence it would not be possible for the trading parties alone to achieve the water 
quality goals. The appropriate size of the cap in such instances cannot be determined by 
objective criteria, but must be established with both water quality, cost and fairness 
consequences in mind.7   
Equivalence Criteria 
Trading programs must be able to translate spatial and source heterogeneity of pollutant loads 
into equivalent water quality results where the water quality standard is to be met, called 
equivalence. Decentralized trading programs require that responsibility for controlling effluent 
loads can be transferred within a defined watershed boundary.  If the cap is based on an analysis 
for a particular spatial location of discharges there must be an assurance that any spatial 
reallocation will not result in a violation of the standard. Because trading programs are designed 
to address a water quality concern in a specific location (say an estuary), the spatial movement of 
loads across the watershed must account for fate and transport to the location of interest.   
Responsibility for controlling loads might also be transferred between dischargers with different 
effluent discharge characteristics.  Quantifying discharges for any particular source or classes of 
sources might have different degrees of certainty surrounding measurement of actual effluent 
load discharge.  Water quality trading programs that involve regulated point sources acquiring 
credits from nonpoint sources must develop acceptable procedures for dealing with differences in 
uncertainties with the measurement or quantification of effluent load.   
                                                            
7 The size of a partial cap (point source cap) can be established in different ways.  One way is to establish the cap 
based on some proportional share of the total load target.  For example, North Carolina has established 30% nutrient 
reduction goals for the Neuse and Tar-Pamlico basins and point source caps are based on a 30% reduction in 
aggregate point source loads from a reference year.  Maryland and Virginia established point source caps based on a 
technology-oriented “bottom-up” approach.  Rather than referencing the cap to the water quality objective, this 
approach applies a particular technology-based concentration standards on sources (in Bay states, this often 
approaches limits of technology requirements) and then aggregates upward into a load cap.     
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While a requirement of any ambient-based water quality management program, equivalence 
requires sufficient knowledge and analytical tools to assess existing pollutant loads and water 
quality conditions, and to estimate the impacts of changing discharge points in the watershed.  It 
should be stressed, however, that such knowledge does not need to be perfect and complete.  
Any complex biological system will exhibit significant uncertainties that may not be irreducible.  
While the trading programs design focus on equivalence issues between point and nonpoint 
sources, equivalence in point source loads are also subject to unknowns and uncertainties 
(Stephenson, Norris and Shabman 1998).   Thus the equivalence criteria are based on reasonable 
systems knowledge and acceptable levels of uncertainties associated with estimating equivalent 
loads across space and between sources.8    
In addition to providing equivalency, a trading program must provide an adequate system of 
quantifying and accounting for changes in load.   A sound system of load accounting ensures that 
trades do not occur at the expense of other pollutant load reductions in the watershed.  A number 
of accounting issues might arise with trades outside a cap (point-nonpoint source trades).  
Additionality is defined as load reductions that occur as a result of a trade, but would not have 
occurred in absence of a trade.   Additionality assures that net pollutant loading does not increase 
as a result of a trade.  In point source-nonpoint source trading, violation of additionality could 
occur when a nonpoint source, such as a farm operation, has implemented a number of effluent 
control efforts. These efforts could have been initiated for a number of reasons unrelated to any 
possible trade.  If the agricultural operation can then also claim these changes as a nonpoint 
source reduction credit and sell that credit to regulated source, no additional reductions were 
achieved to offset the higher point source load.  Additionality arises because of the challenges of 
identifying an appropriate baseline from which to measure changes in effluent loads for sources 
without a requirement to limit loads and without a system to account for all loads.   
Additionality should not be a concern with trading under a cap (point-point source trading).  In 
this case, trading results in the same combined load for the trading partners that would have 
occurred in the absence of trading.  While this situation might sometimes seem to violate the 
requirement that credits sold must be the result of pollutant load reductions that would not have 
occurred in the absence of the trading program, it does not endanger the watershed goals because 
it does not involve the use of load reductions that are needed to achieve those goals.  Point 
source allowances are defined in advanced and fixed in supply.  Hence, in allowance trading 
(point source—point source trading scenario) additionality is satisfied if the trading partners 
collectively achieve their combined allocations.   
                                                            
8 Equivalence is not by any means unique to trading.  Any ambient water quality management program that aims to 
manage multiple sources across the watershed must make management decisions that are based on translating 
different levels and distributions of effluent loads into equivalent water quality outcomes.  
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A closely related accounting problem called leakage occurs from incomplete load accounting.    
Leakage is the induced, but unaccounted for, increases in pollutant loadings that result from trade 
activity.  For example, an agricultural operation could generate nonpoint credits by installing 
BMPs on a portion of its land, say by installing riparian buffers.  Holding all other farming 
activities constant, the riparian buffer would reduce nutrient loads leaving the farm. But, the 
installation of forested buffers may take highly productive bottomland out of production, 
prompting the farmer to bring additional upland acres under active cultivation.  If the intensified 
upland land use causes an increase in effluent loads that are not accounted for in the credit 
calculation, leakage occurs (see box below for other examples).  The lack of regulatory controls 
over nonpoint sources beyond the riparian area makes this type of problem difficult to prevent.   
Trading program designs can address the leakage issue in a number of ways.  Procedures for 
whole entity accounting/reporting of load for all nonpoint source credit providers is one example 
of a program requirement to address leakage.  Evaluation procedures to access or identify (either 
ex post or ex ante) the likelihood or magnitude of leakage may also be undertaken.  In some 
cases, the opportunities and incentives for shifting loads may be relatively small.  If relatively 
large, trading ratios might be amended to reflect the approximate magnitude of leakage that 
might expected to occur.9  
While leakage raises design challenges for trades involving sources outside a cap (point-
nonpoint), it should be pointed out that other types of leakage can occur.  For example, cap 
leakage could also occur outside of the trading program.  In partially capped systems, incentives 
may be created for potentially regulated parties to shift discharge from sources required to 
operate under a mass load cap to sources outside of a cap (see box below for examples of 
leakage).  The opportunity for such load shifting outside of a cap stresses the importance of 
defining an expansive and comprehensive load cap.10  
                                                            
9 As with any program design, the cost of implementing actions to address leakage issues should consider 
administrative cost and feasibility.   
10 This type of leakage is not unique to trading, but is an issue with any regulatory system aimed at limiting mass 
effluent loads.   
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Enforcement/Accountability Criteria 
All trading programs require systems of enforcement. Decentralized trading programs require 
monitoring and verification of discharge (performance), a system to track ownership of 
allowances or credits, and adequate penalties for noncompliance (discharges by a source in 
excess of that authorized under the program rules).    
Within a capped system (ex. point-point trading under a cap) monitoring, tracking, and penalty 
system associated with ownership of allowances are defined in advance of any trades.  Thus, the 
transfer of an allowance does not create any new enforcement activities.   However, the legal and 
permitting mechanisms to register and enforce these trades differ across media. Within the 
CWA, changes in discharge control responsibility must occur within the NPDES permitting 
structure.  All trading requirements will be incorporated into NPDES permits, either directly or 
indirectly by reference, and the existing CWA enforcement mechanisms can be applied to permit 
violations. The ability to satisfy other market-based criteria (exchange flexibility, cost) may 
necessitate that creative forms of permitting be implemented (Shabman and Stephenson 2007). 
Examples of Leakage 
Leakage for Trades outside of Cap (e.g. point-nonpoint) 
• Farm with livestock and cropland ceases application of animal manures 
on owned farm, but rents neighboring farm to apply animal manures; 
enrolls owned farm as generating credits, without enforcement of 
excess nutrients on rented farm. 
• Farm with animals without cropland has been providing neighboring 
farms manure nutrients for application in compliance with a regulatory 
nutrient management plan; farm then contracts to generate credits by 
transporting manure to alternate use; but neighboring farms replace 
nutrient applications with commercial fertilizer.  This results in no 
nutrient application reductions on the total aggregate farms. 
• Dairy farmer offers a land use conversion from row crops to hay to 
generate credits, but to meet his dairy silage needs plows new 
bottomland elsewhere to plant corn. 
 
Cap Leakage 
• Stringent cap on point sources prompts local governments to approve 
more new developments not served by centralized public sewer 
system. Wastewater from new developments are served by small scale 
on-site treatment systems not subject to cap.   
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Trades outside of a cap (ex. point-nonpoint trades) must meet the same basic accountability 
criteria identified above, but differences in assuring accountability in credit creation and 
enforcement occur in the details of implementation. The differences occur for two primary 
reasons: credits are, by definition, only created in the event of a trade (not defined in advance) 
and the exchange involves at least one party that is not legally required to limit discharge in 
absence of a trade.  The basic accountability of credit creation involves verification by the 
regulatory agency or an approved third party that the credits are actually being produced 
according to the credit generating protocols.  Conceptually, the transfer of credits to a regulated 
source (point) would legally allow the buyer to increase discharges.  However, the CWA does 
not provide any mechanisms for enforcement actions against unregulated nonpoint source credit 
suppliers.  States would need to legislate or regulate such actions.  The conditions of credit 
generation would typically become conditions in NPDES permits, thus nonperformance on the 
part of a credit supplier constitutes a permit violation by the buyer.  New regulatory authority 
would have to be created as part of the trading rules, or alternatively, the contracts between 
buyers and sellers and existing contract law could be relied upon as the enforcement mechanism.  
In the former case, passage of new legislation or promulgation of new regulations may be 
required by the state.  In the latter case, the trading rules would set minimum requirements for 
contract provisions but the state would have no direct role in enforcing the contracts. 
Documenting compliance might also differ depending on how loads are quantified. For nonpoint 
source credits where loads are not directly measured, but quantified through modeled changes, 
compliance monitoring and verification would focus on a specific set of observable and 
verifiable actions/activities that are consistent with the modeled changes in load.  Most water 
quality trading programs prescribe one type of nonpoint source quantification, usually best 
management practice estimates and modeling.11 
The means to address the uncertainty of assuring equivalent water quality results and legal 
challenges from shifting load responsibilities to sources outside a cap have important 
implications for the choice criteria discussed earlier.  For dischargers to effectively participate in 
trading programs, participating sources’ contract and legal risks to exchange activities should be 
minimized (investment environment criteria). The main risk perceived by buyers is that the 
credits may not actually be generated, resulting in a default on the contract terms.  Credit sellers 
may fear the same possibility—that events beyond their control could make it impossible to 
supply the credits necessary to fulfill the contract requirements. 
                                                            
11 Although technical in nature and beyond the scope of this paper, ambient monitoring of water quality would better 
assure the public that nonpoint source load reductions are real.  Quantification procedures could be developed to 
smooth or average yearly variations in ambient measurements. Another approach is to calculate a mass balance that 
quantifies total amounts of nitrogen, for example, that enters and leaves the farm.   
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A number of mechanisms can be used to reduce or eliminate the risk of default to the trading 
partners or to assign responsibilities in the event of contract defaults.  Among them are: 
• insurance credit pools; 
• reconciliation periods after the end of the permit reporting period during which regulated 
dischargers could acquire additional credits if necessary; 
• contract provisions that protect the buyer financially in the event of a default; and 
state-imposed penalties for failure to supply credits;  
 
Performance Criteria 
The above discussion describes the basic structural criteria needed for a decentralized trading 
program.  Structural criteria allow program evaluators to measure whether the conditions and 
requirements for a particularly trading program type are adequately implemented.  Structural 
criteria, however, do not directly evaluate program outcomes.  
This section describes performance criteria that can be used to evaluate trading program 
outcomes. The section begins by identifying a common and general list of performance criteria. 
Criteria may be measurable either by quantitative assessment of collected data or qualitative 
assessment based on expert consensus judgment.  In actual program evaluation, the choice of 
performance criteria will depend on program goals of the specific trading program.  Examples 
will be given of both general performance criteria and program specific performance criteria.  
The section concludes with a brief discussion of the requirements and challenges of evaluating 
trading program performance.  
General Performance Criteria 
A general set of water quality performance criteria are: 1) achievement of water quality 
objectives; 2) cost effectiveness; 3) pollution prevention innovation; and 4) equity/fairness 
(Tietenberg and Johnstone 2004; Shortle and Horan 2008) (see Table 2).  
Trading programs are implemented primarily to assist in the achievement of water quality 
objectives. A variety of performance criteria and indicators can be used to evaluate performance 
of meeting water quality objectives (see Table 2).  Some of these water quality trading program 
performance criteria are similar to the structural criteria discussed above.12 
 
                                                            
12 Note that many trading program supporters promote the ancillary benefits from trading (i.e., stream shading and 
wildlife habitat from riparian buffers).  While these benefits may receive a lot of attention, they are not primary to 
the goals of the program.  Thus, we do not include these benefits in our evaluation framework. 
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Achievement of Water Quality Objectives 
At a watershed level, a mass load cap represents a legally binding requirement to limit discharges 
to levels consistent with water quality standards. The greater the portion of discharge sources 
that face no mandatory limits, the less like water quality goals will be achieved and maintained 
over time. Thus an important criterion for water quality trading programs is the portion of total 
effluent load subject to a mass load cap.   
In cases where partial caps apply and capped sources constitute only a relatively small portion of 
the overall load, it would be unrealistic to expect a trading program alone to achieve the overall 
water quality objectives for the entire watershed.  In this case, an appropriate criterion would be 
Table 2:  General Program Performance Criteria 
Achievement of Water Quality Objectives 
Watershed Level Criteria 
Percentage of total load covered by the mass load cap  
Compliance with mass load cap 
Cap leakage 
Avoidance of unintended localized water quality impairments (“hot 
spots”) 
Trade Accounting 
Adequate baselines for nonpoint source credits 
Evidence of leakage   
Accountability/Enforcement 
 Monitoring/measurement /verification of outcomes 
 Penalties for noncompliance 
   
Cost Effectiveness 
Entity-level cost effectiveness 
Allocative cost effectiveness 
Public administration costs  
Private administrative/transaction costs 
 
Pollution Prevention Innovation 
 Investments in research and development 
 Development of patents in pollutant control technologies 
 Improvement in pollutant removal efficiencies over time 
 Reduction in pollutant control costs over time 
 
Equity/Fairness 
Distribution of load responsibility between classes of sources 
Distribution of allowances to regulated (point) sources under a cap 
Distribution of costs among sources and between classes of sources 
Distribution of public subsidies between sources and classes of sources 
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achievement and maintenance (long-term compliance) of the mass load cap on the covered 
sources over time.  Finally, a watershed level criterion would be the absence of localized water 
quality impairments due to trading activity (avoidance of the creation of “hot” spots).  
Criteria to identify consistency with water quality goals can also be identified at the scale of 
individual trades.  For trades with sources without quantified load limits (point-nonpoint trades) 
water quality criteria can be identified to determine whether claimed credit reductions actually 
occur. Criteria for ensuring there is additionality include clear baseline requirements.  
Performance criteria would also identify the potential and occurrence of leakage.  
Finally program outcomes can be assessed based on criteria that ensure adequate compliance 
monitoring, verification, and enforcement. This includes assessment of active monitoring and 
enforcement activities to document performance and compliance with trading program rules.   
Cost Effectiveness  
A key factor motivating interest in trading is the expectation that trading programs can achieve 
water quality goals at lower social cost that alternative mechanisms.  Accordingly, a second set 
of criteria to evaluate trading programs relates to the cost of achieving water quality objectives.  
A program is cost effective when it minimizes the full implementation cost of achieving a 
specific, pre-defined objective.13 
The cost to polluters of a pollution control allocation is the aggregation of their individual costs.  
Their entity-level costs will be a function of the combination of inputs, technologies, and 
practices that they select to achieve their individual effluent limits.  Cost-effectiveness is served 
by providing polluters with discretion to choose the set of inputs, technologies, and practices that 
allows them to minimize their individual costs.   However, entity-level cost efficiency does not 
guarantee system-level cost effectiveness.  Each discharge source could individually minimize 
the cost of meeting individual discharge goal, but the overall allocation of control responsibility 
across sources might not minimize total system costs.  Allocative cost-effectiveness requires that 
pollutant control responsibility across discharge sources be allocated in such a way as to 
minimize the sum of all pollutant control costs.  
                                                            
13 Costs include both capital and operation costs, forgone returns on productive activities, transaction costs and 
public administration costs.  Payments made from a trade and payment of public cost share should not be viewed as 
separate cost categories.  These payments represent transfers between different parties and involve question of who 
pays the costs. 
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In addition to incurring costs from investments in equipment and changes in operations to reduce 
effluent loads, participants in trading will incur various forms of transactions costs from 
executing trades.  High transactions costs can depress participation in trading and trade volumes, 
leading to participation and coordination failures that limit efficiency gains (Shortle and Horan 
2008; Nguyen and Shortle 2007).  A key task of agencies setting up trading programs is to 
consider the implications of trading rules on transactions costs, and to develop information and 
exchange mechanisms that foster low transactions costs. 
Trading programs also entail public sector administration costs.  Public agency costs include 
design, administration, trade approval, and additional monitoring/verification and enforcement 
costs beyond what would be required under a no-trade option.  Trading program may also 
impose new coordination costs on regulated entities.  Such coordination costs involve 
information, negotiation, permitting/contracting, and trade approval costs associated with 
“Number of Trades” as an Indicator of Program Cost Effectiveness 
 
The number of trades made in a trading program is a sometimes suggested 
indicator of cost effectiveness (EPA 2004).  In some trading programs, a trade 
represents a voluntary exchange whereby a low cost source voluntarily 
undertakes greater responsibility for controlling pollutants while a higher cost 
source spends less on control.  Such a trade represents a cost effective 
reallocation of effluent control responsibilities by shifting control responsibility 
to the low cost source.  
As an indicator of program success, the number of trades should be 
interpreted with caution for two reasons.  First, well-designed trading programs 
may stimulate rapid search, development, and implementation of previously 
unknown cost reducing measures at the entity-level (see pollution prevention 
indicators below).  Trades and reallocations may not be initially forthcoming 
because of search for these entity-level cost efficiencies. Second, in some 
types of programs trades are neither voluntary nor done to reduce costs.  As 
described in the first section, programs designed to maintain compliance with 
individual effluent standards may require trades as a last resort to meet 
effluent load limits. In such instances, trades are allowed only after the 
implementation of high cost expensive limits-of-control have been imposed and 
no additional control options are available. In such cases, trades are an 
indication that high costs have been reached, not avoided.  
On the other hand, lack of trades due to high transaction costs, limited trade 
opportunities, or regulatory barriers would indeed be an impediment to cost 
effectiveness. 
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reallocation and/or trading activity.  As discussed earlier, multiple organizational, permitting, 
and market arrangements are available to manage and reduce these costs.   
Pollution Prevention Innovation  
A third evaluative criterion for water quality programs is the rate of pollutant control innovation.  
If water quality is to be maintained over time in the face of population and economic growth, it is 
necessary to continuously improve the technical efficiency of the prevention and treatment of 
pollution.  Innovation also reduces scarce society resources needed to achieve public water 
quality goals.  Different program designs create different pollution prevention incentives which 
could, in turn, produce differential rates of technical change.   
Producing measurable indicators of pollution control innovation is challenging.  Some indirect 
indicators could include the investments in research and development activities or the number of 
pollution control patents filed for a particular category of discharge sources.  Yet, the 
expenditure of money on research and development does not necessarily translate into effective 
pollution control improvements.  Similarly, technical improvements may occur due to 
operational and process refinements for specific production and pollution control technologies.  
These changes might be measured as improvements in effluent removal efficiencies or change in 
pollutant control costs over time.14   
Equity/Fairness 
Another evaluative criterion that may be difficult to define precisely but nonetheless plays an 
important role in comparing program outcomes is equity. Equity describes the perceived fairness 
of the distribution of program results and outcomes.  A trading program may achieve water 
quality objectives and produce cost effective outcomes, but nonetheless produce a distribution of 
costs and outcomes deemed unfair from an equity perspective.  Obviously, perceptions of 
program equity may differ not only across different types of trading programs, but also between 
different groups (point sources, agricultural sources, taxpayers, consumers, utility rate payers, 
etc).   
While perception of fairness is a difficult concept to measure, numerous indicators can be used to 
describe the distribution of program outcomes.  For example, the assignment and distribution of 
pollutant control responsibility across classes of sources will produce different costs across 
                                                            
14 Identifying the effect of a trading program has on rates of innovation is analytically challenging (see discussion 
below). For these reasons, program evaluation might rely on structural evaluative criteria that measure the program’s 
opportunities and incentives to implement new technologies. 
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dischargers. This distribution can be measured as the share of regulatory obligation to the 
contribution of total effluent load to the water body.  Given the structure of the CWA, incentives 
exist for regulatory authorities to assign a larger burden of control responsibility to point sources 
that are already subject to NPDES permitting and/or are “easy” to identify and regulate.  
Regulated point sources may view trading programs as unfair if point sources bear the primary 
burden of achieving water quality standards when their total load is a small portion of the 
watershed total. Trading programs may add to this perception of unfairness if trading is 
perceived as a way to help finance controls that the public agencies refuse to directly regulate.  
Fairness concerns might also arise concerning the distribution of allowances (wasteload 
allocation) between regulated sources under a cap or the distribution of public cost-share funds 
(subsidies) among sources or classes of sources.     
Program Specific Performance Criteria   
The criteria just described are general standards with which a trading program will be evaluated.  
In an evaluation of specific programs, other criteria that relate to specific and unique program 
goals might be need to be identified.  For instance, as discussed earlier, an important program 
goal of some trading programs seems to be the generation of funding/financing for implementing 
nonpoint source controls.  If generating resources for purchasing nonpoint source reductions is a 
program end itself (rather than a means to an end), then the number and value of nonpoint source 
credit purchases annually becomes a performance metric. This performance criteria, however, 
only applies for trading with nonpoint source revenue generation as an explicit goal.  Trading 
programs aimed at achieving a water quality objective for a group of dischargers can be highly 
successful based on the general set of performance criteria described above and never generate a 
single point-nonpoint source trade.  
Evaluating Program Performance  
The ultimate reason to undertake program evaluation is to identify if a trading program is 
successful in meeting these performance criteria.  Evaluation of program performance requires 
an evaluation of program outcomes against a reference condition or alternative (Tietenberg and 
Johnstone 2004).  Conceptually, program outcomes should be compared against outcomes that 
would have occurred if a program without trading or another trading program design had been 
adopted (“with versus without” the program).    
For example, the general set of performance criteria could be applied to the four prototype 
trading programs described in Section 1.  The reference condition would be the individual 
effluent standards implemented through NPDES permits and the nonpoint source reductions 
secured through voluntary nonpoint source cost-share programs aimed at implementing specific 
best management practices.  A trading program evaluation would compare the outcomes 
achieved under the reference condition with those that might be achieved under different trading 
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program designs. Table 3 shows a simple program evaluation matrix based on example 
evaluation.  Of course, the table content would change depending on specific program goals and 
trading program designs.  
While conceptually a “with vs. without” is the appropriate evaluation perspective, such an 
evaluation requires the construction of counter-factual outcomes of what would have occurred 
under a different program.  Thus, program evaluation requires comparison of “alternative 
futures” based on different water quality management structures.  The comparison of programs 
based on performance criteria is an inexact and analytically challenging (and costly) exercise.  
Whether allocative cost-efficiency is being achieved, whether dischargers are implementing 
lowest possible cost control options, and new technologies are being developed are all examples 
of criteria that must be compared against the predicted alternative outcomes (different trading 
program designs).  Similarly, the degree to which water quality goals are achieved must be 
compared to the probability of achieving goals under an alternative policy.  This requires the 
evaluator to either 1) use models to simulate behavior under different program designs or 2) 
perform a comparison of outcomes across different programs with similar background 
characteristics.  
 
Constructing these counter-factual program outcomes can be done in a number of ways, 
including formal modeling, carefully structured empirical comparative system case studies, and 
expert judgment.  Each method has limitations and therefore the results obtained have caveats.  
Computational models can estimate outcomes related to cost and discharge outcomes, but such 
models typically are based on simplified behavioral premises and assumptions that incompletely 
reflect different incentives, behavior, and outcomes that might arise across program designs. 
Comparative analysis attempts to construct plausible counter-factuals by examining outcomes 
across different existing regulatory programs that have similar initial water quality and socio-
economic conditions.   Experimental studies can compare behavior and outcomes under carefully 
controlled settings, but the experimental design, by definition, limits evaluation to specific, 
narrowly defined issues.   Expert judgment involves the qualitative assessment of performance 
criteria from individuals that have extensive knowledge of the structure and operation of water 
quality management programs.   
Simplifying Program Evaluation 
Given the analytical challenges of program evaluation, procedures can be devised to simplify the 
performance evaluation of trading programs.  The simplest form of program evaluation compares 
a pre-existing program with a program that includes some form of trading. The comparison is 
simply “before and after” and is not considered against possible counterfactual trading or non 
trading programs. Such an approach simply asks whether trading programs represent an 
improvement over what existed prior to program implementation.  
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Evaluation criteria are also simplified, and possibly, narrowed based on specific objectives of the 
trading program.   Indicators of expected/or realized outcomes after trading are compared to the 
outcomes before the particular trading design. This more limited type of evaluation can help 
program administrators decide whether the existing programs are an improvement from the 
former regulatory approach using their own internal criteria.   
A simplified approach would be to use evaluative criteria that reflect the goals and objectives of 
specific trading programs.  Evaluative criteria and measurable indicators will be developed that 
reflect these program objectives.  When appropriate, the criteria described above would be used 
in this simplified program evaluation. The objective of this analysis is to evaluate trading 
programs against their own programmatic goals.   
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
This main goal of this report was to describe a general framework that will help inform and 
guide future evaluation of performance of water quality trading programs.  While the impetus for 
this report was a desire to evaluate trading programs in the Chesapeake Bay region, the 
evaluation framework is broadly applicable to trading programs in general.   
 
The following conclusions and related recommendations can be drawn from this report:  
  
The trading programs that have been proposed or implemented to address water quality in the 
Chesapeake Bay region and elsewhere in the U.S. are quite diverse.  The particular program 
designs that have been chosen reflect different program objectives. The trading program’s 
goal(s) not only influences program design and implementation, but will affect program 
performance and the choice of criteria that will be used to measure performance. Therefore, the 
Chesapeake Bay Program should request that each trading program should review and clarify its 
explicit goals.  
 
Despite the data limitations and difficulties, the evaluation approaches described here can 
illuminate, and if needed, improve the performance of trading programs for the future. 
Therefore, The Chesapeake Bay Program should request that assessments of state water quality 
trading programs or experiments in the Chesapeake Bay should apply the systematic evaluation 
procedures described in this report.  
 
Structural design criteria provide a more tractable approach for evaluating the performance of 
water quality trading programs.  Therefore, given the relative analytical difficulty of 
performance evaluation, evaluation using design criteria should be the initial effort in evaluation 
by the state government decision-makers responsible for each current program. The results for 
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that evaluation should be available to stakeholders and member agencies of the Chesapeake Bay 
Program and can be used to make design adjustments as warranted to increase the likelihood that 
program goals will be achieved.   
 
Data and analytical requirements for performance evaluation can be significant; however such 
evaluations may be desired as trading programs mature.  Therefore, as an initial step to 
developing a performance based assessment, The Chesapeake Bay Program should work with 
the states to develop an operational framework for performance evaluation should be developed, 
data and analytical requirements identified, and the costs and benefits for such an assessment 
evaluated.  
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Table 3: Example of a Trading Program Evaluation Matrix    
Performance Criteria Individual 
Effluent Limits 
Cap and Direct 
CAD 
Cap-and-Allowance 
Markets  CAM 
Credit Sales 
CS 
Offsite Compliance 
Credit  OCC 
Water Quality        
    Watershed Level Criteria      
    Trade Accounting      
    Accountability/Enforcement      
      
Cost Effectiveness      
   Entity-Level      
   Allocative cost effectiveness      
   Private Admin Costs      
   Public Admin Costs      
      
Pollution Prevention      
   R&D Investments      
   Development of patents      
   Improvement in removal efficiencies      
   Reduction in control costs over time      
      
Equity      
   Distribution of load responsibility      
   Distribution of allowances      
   Distribution of costs, subsidies      
      
 
